The Gaza Vote:

POLICY IMPACTS OF BIDEN’S APPROACH ON GAZA FOR THE NOVEMBER ELECTION IN FIVE KEY BATTLEGROUNDS STATES

Polling Results – May 2024

YouGov Poll
commissioned by
Americans for Justice in Palestine Action (AJP Action)

- Survey of registered voters in five states: Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
- N= 2500 total, N = 500 per state
- Margin of error per state ranges between +/- 4.9 and +/- 5.35 percentage points

METHODOLOGY IN BRIEF

YouGov recruited respondents from its proprietary panel of nearly 2 million U.S. residents. Only respondents aged eighteen or over who reside in the United States and are registered voters who identify as Democrats or Independents were eligible to participate in the survey. YouGov employs a sophisticated sample-matching procedure to ensure that the respondent pool, to the greatest extent possible, is representative of the statewide demographic makeup in each state. All statistics included use sampling weights to ensure representativeness. The overall margins of error for the samples are: Arizona: +/- 5.17%, Michigan 4.9%, Minnesota 5.06%, Pennsylvania 5.35%, Wisconsin 5.27%. This margin of error is calculated at the 95 percent confidence interval. The margins of error for sub-groups within the sample are greater (e.g. non-Biden voters). The survey was deployed specifically between the following dates in each state: Arizona, May 2-10; Michigan, May 2-9; Minnesota, May 2-10; Pennsylvania, May 1-8; Wisconsin, May 2-9.
THE GAZA VOTE:
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Polling Results – May 2024

In partnership with independent researchers, Americans for Justice in Palestine Action (AJP Action) commissioned a YouGov poll in five key battleground states assessing the impact of Biden’s Gaza policy on his reelection chances in November. In each state, the poll included a representative sample of 500 registered Democratic and Independent voters, and the questions were common in all states. YouGov deployed the survey and used a sampling method that mirrors probability sampling to produce the most representative sample. The polls first asked respondents how they expected to vote in November, generally whether they approved of Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza, and whether the issue had any bearing on their votes in the primaries. The poll then asked about support or approval of specific policies: Biden’s support for Israel’s war in Gaza, an immediate and permanent ceasefire, conditioning or ending aid to Israel, and so on. Respondents were asked if specific Gaza policy changes by Biden would influence their vote in the general election and which changes would be most important—or the minimum necessary to secure or solidify a vote for Biden. The survey concluded with questions about respondents’ perceptions of ongoing events using descriptive framing.

The five battleground states polled were Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Arizona, where Democrats won narrowly in 2020 — or in the case of Minnesota, 2016. These states also had robust “uncommitted” or “ceasefire” candidate campaigns in their Democratic Presidential Primaries, which were anti-war protest votes concerning the Biden administration’s support for Israel’s war in Gaza. These are also states with sizable Arab or Muslim-American populations and progressive urban strongholds that often swing key state elections. We found that across all five states, a critical margin of voters—roughly one in five—are less likely to vote for Biden on account of his handling of the war in Gaza. In addition, 40% or more of Democratic and Independent voters in each state say that imposing an immediate and lasting ceasefire, conditioning aid to Israel, and ensuring full entry of humanitarian aid would make voters more likely to vote for Biden in November.

Through these robust polls, we take a closer look at the issue of Gaza for voters in each of these states and whether a key margin of Democratic and Independent voters will be secured or lost for Biden based on his continued support for Israel’s war. Below we detail key findings overall and by state.
POLL RESULTS: BASELINE SUPPORT FOR BIDEN AMONG DEMOCRATS & INDEPENDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Joe Biden</th>
<th>Third Party or Write-in</th>
<th>Donald Trump</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The remainder of respondents said they would not vote, though all are registered voters and many of those identified as likely voters.*

Importantly, the margin of votes needed to win in each state is central to an understanding of these results. According to a recent New York Times Siena College poll, Trump is leading in Arizona, Michigan, and Pennsylvania by 5%, 7%, and 4%, respectively. In both Wisconsin and Minnesota (by a different poll), Biden is leading by 2%. Those margins are subject to change as we get closer to the election and are also largely within a survey’s margin of error (typically between ± 4-6% on state-wide polls). However, repeated polls suggest Biden is in trouble in battleground states, and by narrow margins.

By most estimations, Biden must win in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin to secure the election if he keeps other states he won in 2020 (including Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, and Minnesota). Similarly, if Biden kept his previous state wins but lost Georgia, Michigan, and Arizona or Minnesota, he would lose the election. Recent Biden approval ratings suggest a race more similar to 2016, with exceedingly narrow margins at stake for electoral victory in November.

We know from past elections, as detailed below, that the margin of victory in the states polled can be anywhere from 15,000 to 155,000 votes. In a state like Wisconsin, for example, the past several major elections have been determined by less than a percentage point, or roughly 20,000 votes. In the case of Minnesota, we find it pertinent to consider the 2016 margin of victory as well, because the current match-up between Biden and Trump looks more similar to 2016 than 2020: in 2016, Clinton won Minnesota by less than 2% of the vote, or 44,765 votes. We note these margins throughout the report to contextualize our findings.
DISAPPROVAL OF BIDEN’S HANDLING OF ISRAEL’S WAR IN GAZA, SUPPORT FOR CEASEFIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Disapprove of Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza</th>
<th>Support an immediate &amp; permanent ceasefire</th>
<th>Are less likely to vote for Biden in November because of his handling of the war in Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>38.4% (-8.90)</td>
<td>76.5% (+65.2)</td>
<td>19.2% (+4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>40.0% (-8.10)</td>
<td>78.2% (+69.0)</td>
<td>22.6% (+6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>37.9% (-12.2)</td>
<td>74.1% (+62.2)</td>
<td>20.6% (+3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>41.5% (-8.10)</td>
<td>82.8% (+74.6)</td>
<td>24.2% (+6.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>46.4% (+5.40)</td>
<td>76.0% (+64.7)</td>
<td>19.8% (+5.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ or – in parentheses indicates the difference from the opposite response, e.g. In Wisconsin, (-8.9) indicates 8.9% more voters somewhat or strongly approve of Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza (not to be conflated with their views of the war itself).

Below is a visual comparison of these poll results and a contrast to 2020 Biden victory margins per state:

This data suggests that across all five states, a critical margin of voters—roughly one in five—are less likely to vote for Biden on account of his handling of the war in Gaza. Although voters are split on whether they approve or disapprove of Biden’s handling of the war, the vast majority (≥75%) across all states still support an immediate and permanent ceasefire. Only a small minority of voters, from 11.2% to 16.1% in Minnesota and Pennsylvania, respectively, strongly approve of the President’s approach on Gaza. Of those, the vast majority in each state (≥64%) strongly support an immediate and permanent ceasefire. That is to say, a change in approach would not lose those votes, but staying on the current path risks doing so. Considering the narrow margin of victory required in each state, we find that Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza, if not corrected, could cost him the 2024 Presidential election.
KEY POLICY CHANGES TO SWING ANTI-WAR VOTERS ON GAZA

We asked a series of questions to determine the likelihood of certain policy changes to affect respondents’ expected votes in November. Across all states and all questions, upwards of roughly 40% of voters in each state say that de-escalatory policy to reel in Israel’s war in Gaza would make voters more likely to vote for Biden in November: that is, imposing an immediate and permanent ceasefire and conditioning aid to Israel. Across all respondents, over a third in each state said they believe the Biden administration should be putting “a lot” more pressure on Israel to stop its war in Gaza (including when taking into account the margin of error of ±4.2 or 4.3).

On specific policy changes that would make individuals more or less likely to vote for Biden in November, roughly 40% or more of Democratic and Independent voters polled in each state said that a ceasefire would make them more likely to vote for Biden in November. Among non-Biden voters in each state (those who did not choose “Joe Biden” when asked how they would vote if the election were held today), over a third in Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin said they would be more likely to vote for Biden if he imposed an immediate and permanent ceasefire. Over a quarter of those voters in Michigan and Minnesota said the same.

Additionally, over 40% of polled voters in each state said that the combination of imposing a lasting ceasefire and conditioning aid to Israel would make them more likely to vote for Biden. Among non-Biden voters in each state, over a quarter of them agreed: Over 33% in Wisconsin and Minnesota, 27% in Arizona, and 31% in Michigan. In Pennsylvania, that number is over 42.2% of non-Biden voters (+30.2 more than those less likely) who said the combination of a ceasefire and conditioning aid to Israel would make them more likely to vote for the sitting president—a higher number than any other policy change alone. Across the sample, 48.2% of Pennsylvania Democratic and Independent voters said that combination (ceasefire + conditional aid) made them more likely to vote for the sitting President.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would ____ make you more likely to vote for Biden?</th>
<th>WI</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>MN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General: policy change to no longer support Israel’s war in Gaza</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15.8)</td>
<td>(+11)</td>
<td>(+20.5)</td>
<td>(+14.9)</td>
<td>(+18.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposing an immediate &amp; permanent ceasefire</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions on aid to Israel</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End the siege on Gaza</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both imposing a ceasefire &amp; conditioning military aid</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents had the following options: more likely, less likely, does not impact my vote. + or – in parentheses indicates the difference from the opposite response, e.g. In Wisconsin, (15.8) indicates 15.8% more voters would be “more likely” than “less likely” to vote for Biden if he changed his policy, broadly, and no longer supported Israel’s war in Gaza.

1 The margin of error for non-Biden voter statistics in each state is higher than for the overall sample: between ±7– 8.4% for each state.
Demographic breakdowns of support for each of the above policy changes shows that Black and Hispanic voters on average have higher levels of support for a baseline policy change, with some variation by state. However, the margin of error on those statistics is significantly higher in many states, so we have chosen not to report on those as definitive findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most important policy change</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>WI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A change in tune to sympathize with Palestinians and to criticize attacks on Palestinians and pro-Palestinian protestors</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditioning military aid and weapons transfers to Israel</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending military aid to Israel, including halting all arms sales</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An end to the decades-long siege on the people of Gaza</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All are equally necessary</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t think the White House should change its policy</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The response “all are equally necessary” is mutually exclusive to any individual policy choice; so the “real support” for any individual policy option as “most important” is the sum of the individual and the “all are equally necessary” statistics.

While not represented in the graph above, on average across all five states, Independents were more likely to say ending the siege on Gaza was among the minimum combination of policy changes required to shift their vote to Biden in November. We do not include detailed breakdowns on Independents because in the representative samples from each state, Independents make up a small relative number of respondents, making the margin of error higher on those statistics.

Below we asked all respondents what minimum combination of policies would secure (for non-Biden voters) or solidify (for Biden voters) a vote for Biden for President. A third or more voters in every state except Minnesota said a lasting ceasefire was among the minimum policies that would be needed to secure/solidify their votes. The next most common minimum policy change was full entry of humanitarian aid (roughly a quarter in each state). In this aggregate view in each state, conditioning and ending military aid have relatively similar proportions of support as a minimum change needed. Across the board, unsurprisingly, a change in tune to sympathize publicly with the Palestinians is the least important change. Finally, in Wisconsin and Arizona, Democratic and Independent voters had somewhat stronger support for ending the siege on Gaza entirely: over 30% said it was a minimum change needed to secure their votes.
In each state, we sampled Democratic and Independent registered voters and asked how they would vote if the election were held today. A large portion (represented at the beginning of this report) said they would vote for Biden, and a small portion said they would vote for Trump. The remainder said they would vote third party, write-in, or not vote at all. Among those, the vast majority identified as likely voters (83-96%). The following results pertain to these potentially persuadable voters. While the margin of error on these statistics varies and is higher than for the sample as a whole, the trends in minimum necessary policies are noteworthy. A ceasefire, humanitarian aid, and ending military aid are the three most popular choices for “minimum change” among non-Biden, non-Trump voters polled—with a sizable portion in each state saying all of the listed changes are equally necessary (see full list of policy changes in the table above).

In every state except Minnesota, at least 45% of these “persuadable” voters said Biden imposing an immediate and permanent ceasefire was among their minimum necessary policy changes to vote for Biden. In all but Pennsylvania, ending all military aid to Israel was more likely to be a minimum policy change than merely conditioning aid. A significant portion of these voters believe that all of the listed policy changes are equally necessary, with the highest proportions in Michigan and Wisconsin, at 33% and 29.8%, respectively. The next most popular “minimum” policy change in most states is the full entry of humanitarian aid. Somewhat surprisingly, fully ending the siege on Gaza was supported by a wide swath of voters: in Wisconsin, a total of 56.5% of non-Biden voters polled believe it’s among the minimum changes necessary to secure or solidify their votes for Biden in November, and over a third in other states.
Among Non-Biden, Non-Donald Trump Voters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum combination of policy changes to support Joe Biden – among non-Biden, non-Donald Trump voters</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>WI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A change in tune to sympathize with Palestinians</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An immediate and permanent ceasefire</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full entry of humanitarian aid</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditioning military aid and weapons</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending military aid to Israel</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An end to the siege on Gaza</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note higher margins of error across the board for these statistics because of smaller sample size.

**“UNCOMMITTED” VOTERS ON BIDEN’S GAZA POLICY**

Each of the states polled had campaigns for a “pro-ceasefire” or “anti-war” vote in the Democratic Presidential Primaries. The state with the greatest polled support for this “uncommitted” campaign in the primaries was Pennsylvania, where 34.6% of respondents said they strongly support the campaign, and another 28.5% somewhat support it. Further support numbers are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings about the uncommitted campaign*</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>WI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat support</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total support</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As many uncommitted campaigns argued, the margin of Democratic and Independent anti-war voters need not be more than 1-5% in these states to have a determinative effect on the election. In Wisconsin and Arizona among uncommitted supporters, upwards of 72% and 82%, respectively, said they were less likely to vote for Biden in November due to his support of Israel’s war in Gaza. This is a sizable difference compared to the overall sample, which found 19.2% in Wisconsin and 22.6% in Arizona saying they were less likely to vote for Biden in November because of his handling of the Gaza war—a more similar number to the overall number who said the war made them less likely to vote Biden in the primary.
Among Michigan’s uncommitted voters polled, a little over 90% said they are less likely to vote for Biden in November on account of his Gaza policy. The next highest proportion of persistent uncommitted voters are in Pennsylvania, where 84% of these voters said Biden’s handling of the war would make them less likely to vote for him also in November.* Minnesota uncommitted voters were lowest on this metric, with roughly 21% of those voters saying it will not affect their vote in November, but 73.5% (±10.4) reporting they are less likely to vote Biden in November due to his handling of the Gaza war.

To put this data in perspective, consider below the breakdown of “uncommitted” or “ceasefire” votes in these five states and the approval ratings for the Biden versus Trump in May of 2020 and presently. The data suggests that Biden’s margin for error in voter approval is significantly narrower than it was in 2020 this far out from the election. In both Wisconsin and Arizona, the number of primary, anti-war voters surpassed Biden’s margin of victory from 2020 in those states. While the other “uncommitted” votes do not surpass the 2020 margin of victory, Trump is leading in all of these states except for Minnesota. Notably, Minnesota’s “uncommitted” campaign did surpass the number of votes by which Clinton won the state in 2016. The final column takes the number of votes for “uncommitted” (or equivalent) in each state and, using the most cynical assumption, applies the percentage of polled voters who said they were less likely to vote Biden in November due to his handling of Gaza; even a low estimate such as that one produces some worrying numbers for the Biden campaign. Under these assumptions, Wisconsin and Arizona would still go to Trump if vote counts were similar to 2020.

* Importantly, the question regarding whether Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza would make a respondent more or less likely to vote for Biden appeared before the question on support for the uncommitted campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>WI</th>
<th>AZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2020 Approval Rating</td>
<td>4.5 Biden</td>
<td>7.5 Biden</td>
<td>4.9 Biden</td>
<td>5 Biden</td>
<td>2.9 Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Vote Margin (%)</td>
<td>7.1 Biden</td>
<td>2.8 Biden</td>
<td>1.2 Biden</td>
<td>0.6 Biden</td>
<td>0.3 Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Vote Margin (#)</td>
<td>233,012*</td>
<td>154,188</td>
<td>80,555</td>
<td>20,682</td>
<td>10,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024 May Approval Rating</td>
<td>2.3 Biden</td>
<td>.9 Trump</td>
<td>1.5 Trump</td>
<td>1.5 Trump</td>
<td>2.6 Trump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024 Uncommitted or Ceasefire Candidate</td>
<td>45,913</td>
<td>101,436</td>
<td>57,951</td>
<td>48,162</td>
<td>15,800**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polled*** Proportion of Uncommitted Voters Less Likely to Vote Biden in November Due to Gaza War</td>
<td>33,746</td>
<td>91,597</td>
<td>48,794</td>
<td>34,725</td>
<td>12,940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approval ratings aggregated from FiveThirtyEight

* Note: In 2016, the margin of victory in Minnesota was 44,765 votes, less than 2%.

** These votes were for Marianne Williamson amid a concerted campaign to vote for her as a pro-ceasefire protest.

*** This is a subset of those who voted uncommitted: it is the proportion of “uncommitted voters” polled who said Biden’s handling of the war made them less likely to vote for him in November. In the polling results, “uncommitted voters” are respondents who said they support the uncommitted campaign and that they were less likely to vote for Biden in the primary due to his handling of the war in Gaza—excluding those who did not vote in the primary.
Our polling shows that support for the uncommitted movement represents a larger share of voters than showed up in the primary, which is significant considering low turnout rates for primaries compared to general elections. In addition, compared to the proportion of uncommitted voters in each state during the primary, a larger share of Democratic and Independent voters overall said they were less likely to vote for Biden in November: upwards of 20% of likely voters in each state except Minnesota, where that number is 18.2%. If those numbers bore out on average turnout rates in a general election in each state, they would make up the following numbers of voters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>WI</th>
<th>AZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Typical Overall Vote Count Among Dems &amp; Independents*</td>
<td>1,769,672</td>
<td>3,655,939</td>
<td>3,734,253</td>
<td>1,912,464</td>
<td>2,066,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Vote Margin (%)</td>
<td>7.1 Biden</td>
<td>2.8 Biden</td>
<td>1.2 Biden</td>
<td>0.6 Biden</td>
<td>0.3 Biden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Vote Margin (#)</td>
<td>233,012**</td>
<td>154,188</td>
<td>80,555</td>
<td>20,682</td>
<td>10,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024 May Approval Rating</td>
<td>2.3 Biden</td>
<td>.9 Trump</td>
<td>1.5 Trump</td>
<td>1.5 Trump</td>
<td>2.6 Trump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncommitted / Ceasefire Votes in the 2024 Primary</td>
<td>45,913</td>
<td>101,436</td>
<td>57,951</td>
<td>48,162</td>
<td>15,800***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For this number, we took overall vote count in each state in 2020, and the percentage of voters who identify as Democrat or no party in the state based on Pew Research Center data regarding party affiliation in each state (WI: 58%, MI: 66%, MN: 54%, PA: 54%, AZ: 61%).

** Note: In 2016, the margin of victory in Minnesota was 44,765 votes, less than 2%.

*** These votes were for Marianne Williamson amid a concerted campaign to vote for her as a pro-ceasefire protest.

The projected vote count numbers above are speculative – applying the polling results to existing voter data and comparing to both victory margins in 2020 and current averaged approval ratings for Biden or Trump in each state. **While they are far from definitive, multiple cuts of the data suggest that President Biden could lose the vote in at least Arizona and Wisconsin due to his handling of Israel’s war in Gaza.** Considering lower turnout rates in primary elections and how tight each of these races look, he could be at risk of losing the election in the other states listed as well: Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota are not guaranteed wins for Biden, although the Biden vote is most secure in Minnesota.
Because the sample size of uncommitted voters (not just supporters) in each state is relatively small, we do not report on those respondents’ policy preferences with any specific statistics, which would have high margins of error. However, the general trend among supporters of the uncommitted protest campaign in the sample is similar to all voters sampled: a permanent and immediate ceasefire, full entry of humanitarian aid, and ending or conditioning military aid to Israel are the most common minimum policy changes needed to move or solidify their votes for Biden in November. Notably, ending military aid is more likely to be a minimum policy change for uncommitted voters than conditioning aid, by a high margin in all states.

ON GENOCIDE, CONDITIONING AID AND ENCAMPMENTS

A January 2024 poll found that roughly 35% of voters across the country believe Israel is committing a genocide in Gaza, and almost equal number did not. Another poll found 50% of Americans believed Israel is probably or definitely committing genocide. In our poll in these five battleground states, when asked if they believed Israel was committing a genocide against Palestinian civilians, roughly 50% or more in each state said “yes.” At most, 19% said “no” and the rest were unsure. Among those who believe Israel is committing a genocide, voters have greater support overall for a full package of policy change to secure or solidify a vote for Biden: from ceasefire, to humanitarian aid, to ending military aid, to ending the siege, and changing tune to sympathize with the Palestinians. Not all of these voters said they would not be voting for Biden, although the vast majority will. Still, the 16% to 25% of Democratic or Independent voters in each of these states that are not voting for Biden, and who believe that Israel is committing a genocide, may make up a key margin of victory in each of these five states.

We also asked what respondents’ views were of the nationwide student “liberated zone” encampments in solidarity with Gaza and their views on conditioning aid to Israel. Among Democrats, we found over 50% in each state support the student encampments calling for university divestment from Israel’s war. Among Independents, that number is more varied, but roughly 20% in each state strongly support the encampments, and anywhere from 10% to 31% more “somewhat support” that student protest effort.

Conditioning Aid to Israel

An April 2024 poll of likely voters across the U.S. found that 30% strongly supported withholding military funds to Israel until the attacks on Gaza stop; another 25% somewhat supported that conditional aid policy. Another poll, specifically of African American voters nationwide, found 59% believe that aid to Israel should be conditioned. Our polls in five states find very similar results: roughly 30% in each state strongly supports conditional aid, 55-66% somewhat or strongly support conditions on aid to Israel. The breakdown by state is below:
Students Encampments

Regarding the student encampments, we provided a basic description of what the student encampments were and asked whether respondents support or oppose that student protest effort. The support or opposition for the encampments is a useful proxy for the penetration of pro-Palestinian messaging in public discourse, at least among Democrats and Independents in each of these states. Many articles point out that the encampments have been publicly maligned by university presidents, elected leaders on the Hill and in local or state-level bodies, and by President Biden himself. In light of that opposition messaging in the public discourse, the fact that over 50% of voters polled support the student encampments is indicative of relatively strong sympathy for Palestine solidarity efforts writ large. Some of this may be in part due to exposure to the students’ reason for the encampments in the framing of the question, indicating that with some baseline awareness of the students’ intended protest effort, roughly 50% or more of Democrats or Independents in the state would support the students. This is slightly higher than national measures of the proportion of Democratic voters that sympathize more with Palestinians than Israelis, a proportion which only recently exceeded those with greater sympathy for Israelis. According to Gallup polls over time, Independents are split, with slightly more sympathy for Israelis (49% compared to 32% for Palestinians). In our polls, if we think of the encampment support as a vague proxy for Palestine sympathies despite persistently negative counter-narrative, Independents in Wisconsin, Arizona and Pennsylvania are 10 to 20 percentage points higher in their “sympathy” for Palestinians compared to the national average.
PROSPECTS FOR PALESTINE AT THE BALLOT BOX

While several pollsters have leveraged national data to argue that the “uncommitted” anti-war movement and Gaza protest movement more broadly is unlikely to play a determinative role in the November election, these state-by-state polls tell a different story: If the path to the White House for Biden requires narrow margins of voters to show up in the key battleground states of Wisconsin, Michigan, Arizona, and Pennsylvania, our data suggest that a change in policy on Gaza – namely rescinding support for Israel’s war specifically by imposing an immediate and permanent ceasefire, ensuring the full entry of humanitarian aid, and ending military aid to Israel – would make Democratic and Independent voters more likely to vote for Biden. Notably, ending military aid is more likely to be considered a vital policy change for key voters than conditioning aid alone. Moreover, key margins of voters particularly in Wisconsin, Arizona, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, say that serious changes regarding Biden’s support for Israel’s war could secure their votes in November. In an election as close as this one is projected to be, the Democratic Party cannot afford to lose these voters.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

The data analyzed are from an original online survey of 500 registered Democratic or Independent voters in each state (n = 2500 total): Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. The survey was designed by independent researcher Halah Ahmad and conducted by polling firm YouGov between May 1 to May 10, 2024.

YouGov recruited respondents from its proprietary panel of nearly 2 million U.S. residents. Only respondents aged eighteen or over who reside in the United States and are registered voters who identify as Democrats or Independents were eligible to participate in the survey. YouGov employs a sophisticated sample-matching procedure to ensure that the respondent pool, to the greatest extent possible, is representative of the statewide demographic makeup in each state. All statistics included use sampling weights to ensure representativeness. The overall margins of error for the samples are: Arizona: +/- 5.17%, Michigan 4.9%, Minnesota 5.06%, Pennsylvania 5.35%, Wisconsin 5.27%. This margin of error is calculated at the 95 percent confidence interval. The margins of error for sub-groups within the sample are greater (e.g. non-Biden voters). The survey was deployed specifically between the following dates in each state: Arizona, May 2-10; Michigan, May 2-9; Minnesota, May 2-10; Pennsylvania, May 1-8; Wisconsin, May 2-9.

To ensure reliable results and internal validity, we ensured question order foregrounded open-ended questions like “if the election were held today, how do you think you would vote?,” “do you approve or disapprove of Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza?,” and “do you support or oppose a permanent ceasefire,” before moving into policy questions. For the policy questions in which we asked if a particular policy would make a respondent more or less likely to vote for Biden (or “would not impact” their vote), we randomized the ordering of the policy options. Finally, we left questions with basic framing language as the final few questions to understand whether basic awareness or framing on those issues was persuasive to voters compared to their initial response regarding approval or disapproval of Biden’s handling of the war, and likelihood of the war to influence their vote.

For further information, please reach out to info@ajpaction.org.